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BILINGUAL-BICULTURAL EDUCATION IN TEXAS
In United States v. Texas, a federal district court ordered the Del
Rio and San Felipe School Districts consolidated and desegregated.
The San Felipe District student body was predominately Mexican-
American (Chicano),2 whereas the adjacent Del Rio District was
comprised of Anglo students.3 Upon determining that the Chicanos
were an identifiable minority group,4 subject to the protection of the
1. Civil No. 5281 (E.D. Tex., Aug. 13, 1971). The original suit was brought
in the eastern district of Texas to desegregate black schools in the eastern and
western districts of the state. United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.
Tex.), modified, 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex.), aff'd in part, 447 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir.), stay denied sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U.S. 1206 (1971) (Black,
Circuit Justice), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). In August 1971 the Del
Rio School District moved to intervene in the above suit to stay the court order
which prohibited transfer of students when the effect would impede desegrega-
tion. The district court granted the motion to intervene, joined the San Felipe
School District, and ordered consolidation and desegregation of the two school
districts. United States v. Texas, Civil No. 5281 (E.D. Tex., Aug. 13, 1971).
The new consolidated school district appealed, but on their motion, joined by
the Department of Justice (having agreed upon a desegregation plan), the case
was remanded to the district court by the Fifth Circuit on November 3, 1971,
without opinion. The district court ordered implementation of a desegregated
plan. 342 F. Supp. 24 (ED. Tex. 1971). This was affirmed on appeal. 466
F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972).
2. The term Mexican-American and Chicano may be used interchangeably.
Chicano derives from Mejicano, the Spanish term for Mexican. Both words refer
to persons born in Mexico and now United States citizens, persons whose parents
or ancestors immigrated to the United States from Mexico, and persons who
trace their ancestry to Hispanic or Indo-Hispanic people who lived in Spanish
or Mexican territory now part of the southwestern United States. See generally
Rangel & Alcala, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas
Schools, 7 I-Iv. Civ. RiGHTS-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 307 (1972); Salinas, Mexican-
Americans and the Desegregation of Schools in the Southwest, 8 HOUSTON L.
REv. 929 (1971).
3. Del Rio, Texas, with a population of slightly over 21,000 has two school
districts within the city limits, Del Rio Independent School District, which is
predominantly Anglo, and San Felipe Independent School District, which is 95%
Chicano. The Anglo children from the nearby Air Force base are bussed to the
Del Rio schools, even though the base is located in the San Felipe district. The
Del Rio schools are newer than the San Felipe schools, and the high school offers
75 to 100 courses while the San Felipe High School offers 36 courses and has
no vocational program. United States v. Texas, Civil No. 5281 (E.D. Tex., Aug.
13, 1971). See also Salinas, supra note 2.
4. Several prior cases have reached similar results in dealing with the question
of Chicanos as an identifiable unit, though not all the cases dealt with de-
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fourteenth amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5
the district court concluded that the separation of school districts
constituted de jure segregation. 6 Accordingly, the court ordered that a
comprehensive desegregation plan be developed. Within this general
mandate was the directive that educational safeguards be developed
to insure that all students were offered equal educational oppor-
tunities. These safeguards were to "include but not necessarily be
limited to bilingual and bicultural programs, faculty recruitment and
training and curriculum design and content."7 After being appealed
to and remanded by the Fifth Circuit, the district court approved
and ordered implementation of a comprehensive educational plan
for the San Felipe-Del Rio Consolidated Independent School Dis-
trict.9 On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed the order.""
The Comprehensive Educational Plan includes many requirements
previously adopted by other courts to deal with black-white deseg-
regation in schools. Where races are segregated in separate school
districts, consolidation of those school districts through busing of
segregation. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Alvardo v. El
Paso Independent School Dist., 445 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Muniz v. Beto,
434 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hunt, 265 F. Supp. 178 (W.D.
Tex. 1967); Independent School Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). The statute provides that no person can be
subjected to discrimination in a school receiving federal financial assistance. A
federal agency or court upon finding a failure to comply may terminate such
assistance. The government or any aggrieved person can sue to have the sanction
imposed.
6. There are several ways in which state authority can support school segrega-
tion. For cases where state law previously sanctioned or required segregation see
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) and Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For cases where a state financially
contributes to the support of a locally segregated school see Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958). For cases where a local school board has aided segregation by
acts or omissions under "color of law" see Dowell v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 269
(1969) and Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d
682 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) for general definitions of actions
under "color of law."
7. United States v. Texas, Civil No. 5281 (E.D. Tex., Aug. 13, 1971).
8. Upon joint motion from both parties, the case was remanded on November
3, 1971, without opinion.
9. 342 F. Supp. at 29.
10. 466 F.2d at 519.
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students is an acceptable remedy to correct constitutional violations."
Desegregation of faculties with corollary control over recruitment,
assignments, promotions and demotions of teachers are mandatory
adjuncts to the desegregation of students?12 The assignment of stu-
dents to make the racial composition of student bodies substantially
similar to that of the overall community and heterogeneous class-
rooms are basic to the desegregation process.13 Desegregation of extra-
curricular activities is similarly required.14
The Texas federal court goes beyond these previously accepted
remedies in its requirement that bilingual and bicultural faculty and
curriculum be provided. Concluding from sociological data that the
desegregation of Chicanos and Anglos will involve special problems,5
11. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Meclenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971); Haney v. County
Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969) for cases dealing with the consolida-
tion of school districts. See, e.g., Hightower v. West, 430 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.
1970); United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 410 F.2d
626 (5th Cir. 1969) where busing is used to achieve desegregation.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S.
225 (1969); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Davis v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 430 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal
Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), rev'd in part
sub nom. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1969);
United States v. Tunica County School Dist., 323 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss.
1970); Redman v. Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 293 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. La.
1967).
13. For cases dealing with student assignment see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441(5th Cir. 1971); Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 434 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.
1970). For cases requiring heterogeneous classrooms see Johnson v. Jackson Parish
School Bd., 423 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1970) and Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish
School Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. La. 1969).
14. See, e.g., Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist.,
410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 283 F.
Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
15. The problems involved in the desegregation of Chicanos and Anglos in-
clude those of any socially subrogated minority group: physical distinctiveness,
educational deficiencies, poverty, malnutrition, and public attitude of racial in-
feriority. Added to these are peculiar problems of the Chicanos as a people:
distinct heritage and culture leading to cultural incompatibilities with Anglos,
singularity of religion, regional isolation and English language deficiencies. See
generally L. GREBLER, J. MOORE & H. GUZMAN, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
PEOPLE (1970); G. STEINER, LA RAZA: THE MEXICAN AMERICANS (1970);
Salinas, supra note 2, at 929 (1971) for general comments about the political
and social environment of the Chicanos.
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the court based its order on two principles: (1) that special con-
sideration should be given Chicanos in aiding them to adjust to a
new environment that presents "a cultural and linguistic shock" and
(2) that Anglo-American students learn to understand and appreciate
the different language and culture of the Chicanos.' 6 In order to
effectuate these two principles, the court's plan required that a bilin-
gual and bicultural program be instituted with the teaching and de-
velopment of both a student's preferred language and a second lan-
guage.' 7 The court held these guidelines applicable to all students,
thereby requiring that Anglo students receive Spanish instruction. 8
To institute this program, the court felt that "bilingual-bicultural"
teachers as well as the training of teachers presently on staff in the
bilingual-bicultural system were mandatory.19
These steps are novel in desegregation law, but many recent de-
segregation cases have involved new approaches to meet new con-
stitutional requirements. The Fifth Circuit before 1968 had approved
desegregation plans which followed the "freedom of choice" method,
particularly when the proposal was patterned on the model plan
propounded by the Fifth Circuit.Y0 In Green v. County School
Board,"-x the Supreme Court, while not holding "freedom of choice"
plans unacceptable, demanded that the plan adopted achieve deseg-
regation immediately.2 2 The Green decision disrupted existing deseg-
regation law because "freedom of choice" had not resulted, in the
majority of cases, in any meaningful amount of desegregation.23
16. 342 F. Supp. at 28.
17. Id. at 30-33, 36.
18. Id. at 30-33.
19. Id. at 29-30, 34-35.
20. The model "freedom of choice" plan was put forward in United States
'. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967). See Gozansky,
Gignilliat & Horwitz, School Desegregration in the Fifth Circuit, 5 HousToN L.
Rev. 946 (1968) for a discussion of this decision. "Freedom of choice" plans
allow a student to choose the school he will attend.
21. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
22. Id. at 439. See 21 VAND. L. Rv. 1093 (1968).
23. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372
F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), admitted that "the Courts acting alone have
failed" to grant equal educational opportunities. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 443 (1968); Bradley v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 431 F.2d 1377 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Board of Educ., 431 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970);
Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 399 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1968) for other school
districts under "freedom of choice" plans subsequently found inadequate.
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"Freedom of choice" was seen as a step toward desegregation, in line
with the "all deliberate speed" guideline previously in force, but it
was not always a method by which desegregation could occur "now."
Since Green, the Fifth Circuit has encountered a wide variety of
methods to bring about immediate desegregation, such as pairing,
rezoning, busing, consolidation and regulation of the location of new
schools.24 In 1971 the Supreme Court compounded the difficulties by
using a test for desegregation which focused on the ratio of black to
white students in the schools as compared to the black-white ratio
of the community as a whole.25 The Fifth Circuit is just encountering
the problems arising under this new decision. Desegregation law is,
therefore, in a state of flux, striving to meet the new constitutional
guidelines by new methods.
In such a situation, one cannot say that the bilingual-bicultural
plan exceeds judicial power to remedy the effects of segregation. In
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,2 6 the Supreme
Court said: "[O]nce a right and a violation have been shown,
the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs
is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable rem-
edies." 27 Pursuant to Swann and before the decision here involved,
the Fifth Circuit ordered the Texas Education Agency to make
[R]ecommendations of specific curricular offerings and programs
which will insure equal educational opportunities for all students
24. See, e.g., note 10 supra (consolidation of school districts and busing);
Plate v. Dade County School Bd., 434 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Hinds County School Bd., 433 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1970) (pairing of
schools); Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 432 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1970);
Wright v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 431 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1970); Young-
blood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 430 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1970) (rezoning of
school attendance lines); United States v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 395 F.2d
66 (5th Cir. 1968); Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 188
(M.D. Ga. 1968) (regulation of the location of new schools); Franklin v. Quit-
man County Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
25. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For
a general discussion of this case and its effects on the Fifth Circuit see Comment,
Busing, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and the Future of Desegregation in
the Fifth Circuit, 49 TExAs L. REv. 884 (1971). See, e.g., Davis v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1970); Mays
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 428 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1970), for other cases
dealing with the general equitable powers of courts in desegregation cases.
26. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
27. Id. at 15.
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regardless of race, color or national origin. These curricular offer-
ings and programs shall include specific educational programs
designed to compensate minority group children for unequal
educational opportunities resulting from past or present racial
and ethnic isolation, as well as programs and curriculum designed
to meet the special educational needs of students whose primary
language is other than English.
28
The bilingual-bicultural directive by the district court follows the
philosophy of these two cases. Other courts and the federal govern-
ment have also strived to provide remedial education to socially dis-
advantaged children.2-
Since the Constitution recognizes the right to equal educational
opportunity and since segregated schools are unequal per se, thereby
requiring desegregation,30 the remedy to achieve desegregation must
take into account the peculiar characteristics of the minority group
that is being desegregated. 31 This applies especially to Chicano stu-
dents. If a non-English speaking Chicano child is placed in a class
taught only in English, he is not in the same position as his English-
speaking Anglo peers and is not being granted an equal educational
opportunity. This obstacle could be overcome by providing special
classes for Chicano students, but this would defeat the purposes of
desegregation.32 Bilingual programs, therefore, provide Chicano chil-
dren with equal, not extra, education. To make bilingual teaching
viable (so each class is not taught first in English and then in Span-
ish), all of the students in a class must become proficient in both
languages. This allows both groups to be in an equal position in the
classroom and thus able to receive an equal educational opportunity.33
28. 447 F.2d at 448.
29. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1967); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Bilingual Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880(b) (1968).
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967); Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
32. See cases cited note 12 supra.
33. For further discussion see Rangel & Alcala, Project Report: De Jure
Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, supra note 2. It can be contended
that not teaching in Spanish to non-English speaking Chicanos would violate
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In a desegregated atmosphere where bilingualism is utilized, edu-
cation in the minority culture furthers desegregation. Maintenance
of the Chicano culture for the Chicano child and knowledge by the
Anglo child of that culture can only aid understanding between the
races and encourage mutual as well as self-respect. Knowledge coupled
with respect may be the necessary prerequisites to end racial sep-
aration.
The logic of this case may have a substantial effect on desegrega-
tion law. The arguments for the constitutional necessity of a bilin-
gual-bicultural curriculum are based on the premise that it is a
method to bring about desegregation. The district court stated, how-
ever, that its order was issued with the goal of "true integration as
opposed to mere desegregation .. . -34 If the words can be taken in
their literal sense, the ramifications of the decision may be far greater
than they seem on the surface.3 If true integration is the aim, then
what are the requirements for fulfillment? Since racial mixing is not
sufficient, the extent of special educational programs to achieve "true
integration" must be determined.
Postponing the issue of the type of segregation necessary before
desegregation is required, there is also the problem of which racial
or ethnic groups qualify for minority culture education. Involved in
this consideration would be the determinants of size, distinctiveness
and identifiability. Groups to be considered for bilingual education
could include Eskimos in Alaska, Chinese and Japanese wherever
they are located in substantial numbers, Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans
in the East, Cubans in Florida, and a multitude of Indian tribes
located in the Midwest, Southwest and South.
Until recently, desegregation has been limited to areas where de
jure segregation was found. But if "true integration" is the goal, the
the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (identical treatment of persons not identically situated
may violate equal protection if it results in a denial of a fundamental right).
See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d696 (5th Cir. 1962) (neutral state action can violate fourteenth amendment);Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. Supp. 724 (M.D. Ala. 1963), modified, 331 F.2d 841(5th Cir. 1964).
34. 342 F. Supp. at 28.
35. The decision would undoubtedly affect the educational systems wherever
Chicanos are a substantial minority. Schools throughout the Southwest and
California must evaluate their curriculum in light of this decision.
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question of the constitutionality of de facto segregation is raised. The
extensiveness of the requirement of "true integration" involves the
breadth of remedies needed to acquire it. Since political boundaries
have frequently been ignored in dealing with de jure segregation, this
would also occur in dealing with de facto segregation. "True integra-
tion" could require more than ignoring school district boundaries
and township boundaries, but also city and county boundaries or
even state boundaries. These and innumerable other problems await
the courts' determination if the goal of "true integration as opposed
to mere desegregation" is adopted.*
Stephen Geddes Sneeringer
* The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held in Lau v. Nichols,
472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1973), that Chinese students enrolled in San Francisco
schools who had English deficiencies were not denied equal protection by the
failure of the school system to provide compensatory English instruction. The
court determined that the linguistic deficiencies of the Chinese students were not
caused nor furthered by any de jure segregationalist policies of the school system
itself. The court concluded that the school district need only provide non-Eng-
lish speaking Chinese students with the same educational opportunities as it
provided English speaking students and that failure to provide remedial education
was not a denial of equal protection.
By its decision and through its discussion of United States v. Texas, the Ninth
Circuit limited compensatory or bilingual education to those groups that were
denied equal educational opportunity because of de jure segregation. Bilingual
and compensatory education was required only when the linguistic deficiencies
of minority students were caused in any manner by past segregation in the
schools. When such de jure segregation is lacking, the school is not required to
provide remedial education to culturally disadvantaged students.
The dissent, on the other hand, found that a prima facie case of a denial of
equal protection was established. Once a state provides education, it must grant
each child an equal educational opportunity even if this entails remedial educa-
tion to place certain culturally disadvantaged students on an equal footing with
other students.
The Lau decision distinguished the scope and applicability of the bilingual-
bicultural system instituted in the Texas case by applying the traditional de jure-de
facto segregation distinction. The Ninth Circuit failed, however, to reconcile
the language and logic of United States v. Texas with its legal justification.
Questions as to the extent and applicability of bilingual-bicultural education re-
main for resolution. The Ninth Circuit has not helped in the resolution of these
conflicts.
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